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	 In	1974,	a	small	group	of	American	plant	scientists	traveled	to	China	as	the	US	Plant	
Studies	Delegation,	ostensibly	to	open	channels	of	communication	and	exchange	with	
Chinese	scientists	and	to	assess	the	present	state	of	research	in	the	plant	sciences	in	China.	
During	their	month-long	stay,	the	delegation	visited	academic	institutes	and	peasant	
communes,	made	observations	of	agricultural	field	trials	and	carried	on	conversations	with	
scientists	and	cadres.	Although	the	final	report	described	the	group	as	"favorably	impressed	
by	the	quality	of	farming	and	the	appearance	of	most	crops"	encountered	on	their	travels,	it	
also	expressed	delegates'	skepticism	about	the	current	and	future	state	of	agricultural	
research	and	education,	given	the	recent	upheavals	of	the	Cultural	Revolution.	"China's	
agricultural	progress…	will	depend	in	large	part	on	the	ability	to	reconstruct	scientific	and	
educational	institutions	in	such	a	way	that	new	scientific	and	technological	information	and	
materials	are	produced	in	a	highly	effective	way"	and,	further,	on	the	development	of	a	new	
generation	of	researcher	and	teachers	"to	replace	the	relatively	few	highly	trained	scientists	
and	scholars	now	available."1	
	
Although	the	US	Plant	Studies	Delegation	could	hardly	have	known	the	details,	the	
two	decades	preceding	their	visit	had	witnessed	massive	turmoil	with	respect	to	Chinese	
agricultural	research	and	education.	The	mass	mobilization	of	the	Great	Leap	Forward	
(1958–61)	and	the	political	struggles	of	the	Cultural	Revolution	(begun	in	1966)	had	not	only	
seen	academic	institutions	dismantled	and	scientists	persecuted,	with	the	obvious	effects	
on	research	and	education,	but	also	the	elaboration	or	intensification	of	ideas	about	a	
specifically	socialist	science:	about	who	should	practice	science,	where	and	in	what	ways,	
and	even	what	it	meant	to	conduct	a	scientific	experiment.	The	resulting	configuration	of	
                                                
1	American	Plant	Studies	Delegation	(1975),	pp.	xi,	xii.	
  
institutions	and	activities	at	times	confounded	Plant	Studies	delegates,	who	arrived	with	
their	own	ideas	about	what	constituted	effective	research.	For	example,	as	the	delegate	
Philip	Kuhn	observed,	although	"experiments"	were	touted	as	central	to	the	work	of	rural	
agricultural	stations,	"much	of	the	experimental	work	at	this	level	actually	consists	of	
demonstrations	to	show	peasants	the	greater	yield	of	improved	seed	or	more	advantageous	
planting	densities,	and	thereby	overcome	conservative	prejudices"	(quotation	in	Schmalzer,	
pp.	133–34).		
	
	 Just	as	Kuhn	arrived	in	China	with	established	notions	of	what	constituted	
experimentation	versus	demonstration	or	extension	in	agricultural	work,	so	too	might	a	
historian	approach	an	account	of	agricultural	modernization	in	the	twentieth	century	with	
fixed	notions	of	the	roles	of	experiment	and	extension	in	this	process.	Numerous	studies	
have	explored	the	histories	of	not	just	agricultural	research	and	its	relationship	to	
agricultural	practices,	but	also	the	institutionalization	of	research	activities	in	university	
departments,	government	agencies,	and	agricultural	stations.	They	have	carefully	charted	
the	implication	of	agricultural	science	in	political	wrangling	at	local,	national,	and	
international	levels.	Yet	just	as	Kuhn	had	to	adjust	his	received	ideas	to	make	sense	of	the	
world	he	encountered	in	Maoist	China,	so	too	must	historians	who	read	Sigrid	Schmalzer's	
Red	Revolution,	Green	Revolution	or	Tiago	Saraiva's	Fascist	Pigs	revise	their	ideas	about	the	
nature	of	agricultural	experiment	and	extension	to	grapple	effectively	with	the	histories	of	
agricultural	modernization	these	present.	
	
Over	a	number	of	decades,	historians	have	developed	rich	accounts	of	agricultural	
research	institutions,	especially	in	the	United	States	and	Europe,	as	sites	where	scientific,	
state,	and	commercial	interests	came	together	(albeit	not	without	conflict)	to	support	
agricultural	modernization.2	As	historians	have	often	emphasized,	public	funding	for	these	
institutions	was	as	much	about	retaining	the	support	of	subjects	and	citizens	as	it	was	about	
improving	production.	In	the	German	states,	where	public	funding	began	to	play	a	
significant	role	in	the	organization	of	agricultural	research	and	education	in	the	1840s,	
states'	support	of	agricultural	schools	and	colleges,	model	farms,	experiment	stations,	and	
extension	activities	aimed	to	support	industrialization	and	feed	growing	populations—and	
to	keep	powerful	estate	owners	and	politically	volatile	peasant	farmers	content.3	In	the	
United	States,	the	creation	of	publicly	funded	agricultural	colleges	and	state	experiment	
stations	in	the	late-nineteenth	century	served	similar	ends.	As	the	historian	Charles	
Rosenberg	summarized	in	his	classic	work	on	this	topic,	placing	emphasis	on	appeasement	
over	other	aims,	"subventions	for	[agricultural]	research	were	concessions	to	farm	power	in	
the	form	of	a	pork-barrel	issue	easily	clothed	in	the	neutrality	of	science	and	justified	in	
terms	of	the	traditional	virtues	granted	the	yeoman	cultivators	of	the	nation's	farms."4		
                                                
2	On	the	development	of	agricultural	research	institutions	in	the	United	States,	see	
Rosenberg	(1997),	Rossiter	(1979),	and	Marcus	(1985).	On	the	German	case,	see	Finlay	
(1992)	and	Harwood	(2005,	2012),	and	for	the	Netherlands	see	Maat	(2001).	For	a	
contrasting	account	of	Russian	agricultural	institutions	that	de-emphasizes	the	role	of	
government,	see	Elina	(2002,	2014).	
3	Harwood	(2012),	pp.	18–33.	
4	Rosenberg	(1971),	p.	2.	
  
	
Of	course,	a	growing	number	of	agricultural	research	institutions	meant	ever-
increasing	opportunities	for	professional	scientists.	Pork-barrel	politics	notwithstanding,	
scientists	working	in	relevant	disciplines—animal	science,	botany,	chemistry,	entomology,	
genetics,	nutrition,	soil	science,	and	others—took	advantage	of	their	alleged	centrality	to	
national	economies	and	leveraged	this	to	achieve	greater	independence	and	resources	over	
time.	
	
One	recurring	source	of	tension	within	expanding	agricultural	research	institutions	
was	that	of	the	relevance	of	scientists'	activities	to	the	everyday	needs	of	growers.	How	did	
laboratory	studies	carried	out	at	the	university,	or	even	field	trials	at	the	agricultural	station,	
translate	into	more	efficient,	effective	production	on	farms?	Resolving	this	concern	was	
especially	important	in	contexts	where	farmers	harbored	doubts	about	the	usefulness	of	
long-term	research	projects	or	those	that	considered	topics	not	immediately	relevant	to	
farm	tasks.5	In	the	United	States,	a	system	of	"cooperative	extension"	inaugurated	in	1914	
aimed	to	bridge	this	gap,	in	both	perception	and	practice.	The	key	figure	in	this	system	was	
that	of	the	farm	advisor,	a	professional	affiliated	with	the	state's	agricultural	research	
institutions	but	assigned	to	work	directly	with	local	farmers	as	a	source	of	expert	
knowledge.	As	the	sociologist	Christopher	Henke	tells	us,	the	rapid	instantiation	of	the	US	
extension	system	after	World	War	I	meant	that	"at	that	time,	and	likely	still	today,	
Cooperative	Extension	represented	the	most	widespread	and	pervasive	arm	of	state-based	
expertise	in	the	United	States."6		
	
Henke's	account	offers	many	insights	into	extension's	role	in	maintaining	a	certain	
"ecology	of	power"	in	California	agriculture.	For	one,	the	new	extension	service	and	its	
associated	farm	bureaus	provided	an	alternative	to	more	disruptive	and	overtly	political	
farm	organizations	like	the	Grange,	thereby	appealing	to	those	who	wished	to	maintain	the	
status	quo	distribution	of	power	and	authority	in	the	rural	United	States.	Furthermore,	in	
California,	and	likely	elsewhere,	extension	advisors	quickly	oriented	their	activities	to	serve	
the	interests	of	large	commercial	farms—often	those	most	ready	and	able	to	adopt	the	
technical	solutions	promoted	via	university	research—over	smaller	production	units.	The	
extension	system,	in	other	words,	helped	to	cement	the	already	on-going	process	of	
consolidation	and	industrialization	in	U.S.	agricultural	production.7	
	
Accounts	of	the	entangling	of	scientific,	state,	and	commercial	interests	in	the	co-
development	of	robust	research	and	extension	institutions	and	industrial	agricultural	
systems	can	be,	and	has	been,	made	more	complex—and	even	more	overtly	about	political	
power.	This	is	especially,	though	not	exclusively,	true	where	historians	have	considered	
                                                
5	This	is	often	posited	as	a	reason	for	the	flourishing	of	genetics	at	American	agricultural	
institutions,	as	plant	and	animal	breeding	experiments	could	be	used	to	simultaneously	
pursue	research	aims	and	appeal	to	the	desire	for	improvement	of	crops	and	herds.	See,	
e.g.,	Kimmelman	(1983,	1987),	Paul	and	Kimmelman	(1988),	Cooke	(1997),	Rosenberg	
(1997),	and	Allen	(2000).	
6	Henke	(2008),	pp.	14–15.	
7	Henke	(2008),	pp.	21–41.	The	idea	of	an	"ecology	of	power"	is	described	on	pp.	4–10.	
  
cases	outside	the	liberal,	capitalist	(or	emerging	capitalist)	socio-political	contexts	that	
dominate	in	Euro-American	stories.	The	historian	Christophe	Bonneuil's	account	of	peanut	
research	in	French	colonial	Senegal,	for	example,	suggests	that	institutions	for	breeding	and	
distributing	"improved"	peanut	varieties	aimed	more	to	control	local	peoples	than	to	
improve	peanuts.8	Similarly,	critical	histories	of	the	Green	Revolution,	in	particular	those	
focused	on	the	agricultural	research	programs	established	by	the	Rockefeller	and	Ford	
Foundations,	emphasize	the	political	alignment	of	these	programs	as	well	as	the	
redistributions	of	power	that	resulted	from	them.	Historians	have	called	attention	to	the	
vision	of	extending	familiar	systems	of	capitalist,	industrial	agricultural	production	
embraced	in	these	programs,	which	created	inroads	for	American	firms.	They	have	also	
highlighted	the	aim	of	creating	cooperative	capitalist	farmers	out	of	potentially	disruptive	
peasant	agriculturalists—an	agenda	that	aligned	well	with	US	political	interests	in	the	midst	
of	the	Cold	War.9	Of	course,	agricultural	research	in	industrialized	countries	at	times	also	
aimed	at	controlling	farmers	and	farm	communities,	not	least	by	relegating	key	means	of	
production	(seeds	in	particular)	to	scientific	and/or	commercial	oversight.10		
	
In	short,	through	the	efforts	of	many	scholars	who	have	charted	the	histories	of	
agricultural	modernization,	we	have	learned	to	see	the	agricultural	sciences	and	scientists	of	
the	twentieth	century	embedded	in	local,	national,	and	international	politics,	and	
responsible	for	myriad	redistributions	of	power	through	their	research	and	extension	
activities.	
	
Yet	even	if	many	of	us	are	prepared	to	accept	these	political	dimensions	of	
agricultural	science,	it	is	still	bold	to	claim	that	these	sciences,	including	their	institutions	of	
experiment	and	extension,	have	been	constitutive	of	political	regimes—that	is,	that	they	
have	been	foundational	to	the	envisioning	and	enactment	of	these.	That	is	exactly	the	
argument	made	for	socialist	China	by	Schmalzer,	and	in	fascist	Europe	by	Saraiva.	Through	
their	powerful	narratives,	which	delve	into	subjects	and	materials	to	date	largely	untouched	
by	others,	each	author	provides	a	striking	new	vantage	from	which	to	assess	the	central	
importance	of	agricultural	sciences	in	different	economic	and	political	contexts.	Schmalzer	
and	Saraiva	move	beyond	the	established	stories	of	agricultural	modernization	under	free-
market	capitalism,	amidst	colonial	development,	and	within	the	Green	Revolutions	of	Latin	
America	and	South	Asia—the	narratives	that	loom	largest	in	the	English-language	
literature.11	In	revealing	the	efforts	made	to	build	revolutions,	nations,	and	empires	upon	
the	institutions	and	products	of	modern	agricultural	science,	these	histories	demand	that	
readers	re-evaluate	both	assumptions	specific	to	each	of	their	cases,	such	as	the	purported	
                                                
8	Bonneuil	(1999).	See	also	Scott	(1998).	
9	See,	e.g.,	Oasa	(1981),	Perkins	(1997),	and	Cullather	(2010).	
10	See,	e.g.,	Fitzgerald	(1993)	and	Kloppenburg	(2004).		
11	For	recent	scholarship	on	agricultural	science	in	fascist	Europe,	see	contributions	to	
Historical	Studies	in	the	Natural	Sciences	40(4),	special	issue	on	genetics,	food	production,	
and	fascism.	Prior	scholarship	on	science	under	Nazism	had	called	attention	to	the	support	
of	agricultural	science	under	Hitler,	including	plant	breeding;	see,	e.g.,	Heim	(2008).	For	a	
recent	account	of	the	early	history	of	agricultural	experiment	stations	in	China,	see	Lavelle	
(2015).	
  
rejection	of	agricultural	modernization	with	in	European	fascism	and	Maoism,	as	well	as	
broader	characterizations	of	the	relationship	between	agricultural	science	and	politics.		
	
Which	brings	us	back	to	Philip	Kuhn,	of	the	1974	US	Plant	Studies	Delegation,	and	his	
musing	on	the	meaning	of	"experiment"	as	he	heard	it	discussed	at	agricultural	institutions	
in	China.	"Experiment"	did	indeed	carry	different	implications	in	socialist	China,	and	not	only	
in	the	context	of	agricultural	research	and	education.	As	Schmalzer	describes,	the	reason	for	
labeling	as	"experiments"	agricultural	activities	that	looked	like	to	an	American	observer	like	
demonstration	or	extension	(e.g.,	showing	famers	the	best	methods	of	planting	or	
introducing	them	to	more	productive	varieties)	was	that	"'experiment'	suggested	
faithfulness	to	local	needs	and	provided	room	for	the	agency	of	local	people"	(p.	134).	In	
Maoist	China,	agricultural	extension	had	to	assume	a	form	that	could	be	seen	to	draw	on	
and	to	validate	tu	science—that	associated	with	local	knowledge,	self-reliance,	and	mass	
mobilization	as	opposed	to	the	yang	science	associated	with	elites,	foreigners,	Western	
scientists,	or	Chinese	experts	educated	abroad—however	much	the	state	still	valued	and	
depended	on	professional	scientific	and	technical	expertise.	So	although	the	agricultural	
extension	system	adopted	in	China	in	the	1950s	"bore	a	clear	resemblance	to	that	of	the	
United	States"	(p.	32),	revolutionary	politics	transformed	the	nature	and	especially	the	
depiction	of	the	activities	carried	out	therein.	These	were	not	to	be	understood	as	places	
where	yang	experts	created	knowledge	that	would	be	transferred	to	the	masses	but	rather	
as	places	where	the	masses	and	technicians	(and	cadres)	would	come	together	to	
experiment	with	agricultural	practices	and	together	discover	those	that	should	be	adopted	
more	widely.	
	
This	articulation	of	the	nature	of	experiment	in	agricultural	investigations,	and	the	
role	of	the	masses	in	the	creation	of	knowledge,	emerged	amidst	successive	transitions	of	
China's	experiment	and	extension	network.	In	1962,	following	a	post-Great	Leap	Forward	
redirection	of	agricultural	research	and	production,	the	state	increased	support	for	its	
decade-old	system	of	"agrotechnical	extension	stations."	A	decision	to	expand	the	number	
of	"demonstration	farms"	followed	in	1963,	places	where	new	varieties	and	methods	would	
be	tested	and	best	practices	disseminated	to	local	farmers.	(p.	39)	Such	sites	were	taken	to	
be	the	central	nodes	necessary	for	the	transformation	of	agricultural	production;	here	
experiments	would	be	conducted,	and	scientific	knowledge	created	and	shared.	As	early	as	
May	1964	the	otherwise	technocratic	appearance	of	these	stations	began	to	transform,	with	
the	appearance	of	"mass	scientific	experiment	small	groups"	bringing	together	"expert	
research"	and	"mass	science"	(p.	40).	And	in	1965,	the	National	Conference	on	Agricultural	
Experiment	launched	an	"agricultural	scientific	experiment	movement"	described	in	one	
report	as	"a	revolutionary	movement	with	demonstration	fields	as	the	center,	specialized	
science	and	technology	teams	as	the	backbone,	and	mass	scientific	experiment	as	the	
foundation"	(p.	40).	
	
The	apparent	contradictions	at	heart	of	these	initiatives	are	also	at	the	heart	of	
Schmalzer's	historical	investigation	of	what	"scientific	farming"	meant	in	socialist	China.	
How	did	"the	ideal	of	a	revolutionary	bottom-up	experiment	process"	exist	alongside	"the	
impulse	to	impose	national	models	on	local	communities"?	How	did	"the	technocratic	
privileging	of	elite,	professional	science"	persist	amidst	"radical	insistence	on	the	primacy	of	
mass	science"?	(p.	22)	Schmalzer	explores	these	questions	by	examining	closely—indeed,	
  
impressively	closely,	given	the	nature	of	sources	available—the	lived	experiences	of	
individuals	who	engaged	in	agricultural	research	and	extension	amidst	the	tumult	of	the	
Cultural	Revolution—tu	scientists,	yang	scientists,	local	cadres,	state	agents,	peasant	
technicians,	and	sent-down	youths.	
	
The	story	that	emerges	from	her	careful	readings	of	Mao-era	official	documents	and	
reports,	later	written	accounts,	and	recollections	gathered	through	her	own	interviews	
reveals	the	centrality	of	agricultural	modernization	to	the	"red	revolution".	"'Scientific	
farming'	was	embraced	in	socialist	China	as	a	means	for	the	radical	transformation	of	
society,"	she	writes	(p.	5).	This	would	be	a	socialist	transformation,	in	which	better	methods	
and	approaches	were	to	emerge	at	the	grassroots	(albeit	with	the	help	of	elite	expertise),	
overthrowing	top-down,	elitist	structures	while	also	enhancing	production	and	raising	
standards	of	living.		
	
Schmalzer's	account	also	encourages	a	reconsideration	of	the	standard	elements	of	
agricultural	modernization,	which	in	socialist	China	incorporated	new	technologies	like	
mechanized	tools	and	chemical	fertilizers	while	simultaneously	vaunting	old	ones	like	
intensive	cultivation	and	green	manures.	She	urges	us	to	avoid	taking	the	celebration	of	
peasant	knowledge	and	the	incorporation	of	"traditional"	techniques	into	the	practices	of	
scientific	farming	as	evidence	that	China's	radical	socialist	leaders	rejected	science	and	
modernization.	Indeed,	Schmalzer	assures	us	that	the	opposite	is	true.	The	agricultural	
revolution	imagined	for	China	"looked	strikingly	similar"	to	that	envisioned	by	U.S.	officials	
for	Latin	America	and	South	Asia	in	the	1950s	and	60s:	higher	yields	produced	through	
modern	equipment,	modern	seeds,	and	modern	chemical	technologies	(p.	3).	Similarly,	the	
valorization	of	peasant	knowledge	in	propaganda	and	the	efforts	made	to	collect	and	
disseminate	their	accumulated	wisdom	were	counterbalanced	in	practice	by	a	widely	shared	
view	of	peasants	as	"backward"	and	in	need	of	new	techniques	and	technologies.	What	
made	China's	approach	to	agricultural	modernization	different	from	the	green	revolutions	
encouraged	elsewhere	was	not	its	stance	toward	modern	science	and	technology.	It	was	
instead	the	roles	identified	for	agricultural	scientists	versus	peasant	farmers	in	the	creation	
and	implementation	of	new	agricultural	practices—and,	of	course,	the	promised	political	
outcome.	Agricultural	modernization	would	not	suppress	revolution,	but	foment	it.		
	
Saraiva,	too,	offers	a	corrective	narrative	about	the	embrace	of	modernization	by	
political	regimes,	in	this	case	the	fascist	governments	of	mid-twentieth	century	Germany,	
Italy,	and	Portugal.	In	his	exploration	of	the	institutions	and	individuals	behind	the	creation	
and	dissemination	of	such	things	as	disease-resistant	wheat	varieties	and	hearty	sheep	
breeds,	he	dismantles	the	notion	that	the	back-to-the-land	movements	of	these	regimes,	
with	their	emphases	on	peasants	and	soil,	pigs	and	potatoes,	were	somehow	pitted	against	
modern	science	and	technology.	The	creation	of	uniform	wheat,	profitable	sheep,	and	other	
"technoscientific	organisms"	by	expert	breeders	at	state-sponsored	institutions	depended	
on	scientific	expertise,	and	their	wider	dissemination	on	the	industrializing	ambitions	of	
both	scientists	and	national	leaders.		
	
Consider	the	case	of	Nazi	potatoes.	Prior	to	1933,	scientists	at	the	Biologische	
Reichsanstalt	für	Land-	und	Forstwirtschaft	(BRA)	had	established	procedures	for	evaluating	
potato	varieties,	a	staple	of	German	agriculture,	for	disease	resistance	and	other	desirable	
  
qualities	and	generating	lists	of	approved	types.	Its	activities	of	potato	surveillance	and	
market	intervention,	pursued	in	the	name	of	increasing	national	potato	production,	
expanded	dramatically	under	Nazism	as	state	interest	in	food	self-sufficiency	escalated.	In	
1934,	under	a	Seed	Decree	issued	by	the	Nazi	Government,	a	crop	registry	system	was	
established	that	limited	marketable	varieties	to	only	those	on	the	approved	list.	Whereas	
farmers	in	the	1910s	would	have	had	access	to	some	1,500	potato	varieties,	the	list	by	1937	
was	limited	to	just	74	(p.	80).	Although,	strictly	speaking,	the	Reichsnährstand	(RNS,	a	
government	body	established	to	regulate	and	supervise	all	aspects	of	food	production)	took	
responsibility	for	enforcing	the	Seed	Decree,	the	staff	of	BRA	performed	key	tasks	such	as	
producing	the	list	of	varieties—a	list	based,	ultimately,	on	knowledge	of	potato	diseases	and	
techniques	for	rapid	evaluation	that	had	been	developed	at	BRA	over	decades.	The	BRA	was	
responsible	for	further	potato-related	duties,	including	tracking	and	eliminating	potato	
pests,	developing	standardized	procedures	for	pathogen	testing,	breeding	blight-resistant	
potato	varieties,	and	more.	As	Saraiva	reminds	us,	"The	capacity	of	the	RNS	to	intervene	in	
German	agriculture	grew	with	each	new	experimental	system	developed	by	the	BRA";	as	
such	its	scientific	staff	were	playing	an	"important	part	in	the	expansion	of	the	Nazi	regime"	
(pp.	98–99).	
	
By	following	specific	organisms—indeed,	specific	breeds—over	time	and	through	
space,	Saraiva	makes	a	strong	case	that	one	ought	to	understand	these	not	simply	as	"tools	
of	fascism"	but	as	"major	elements	in	imagining	a	fascist	alternative	modernity"	(p.	10).	As	
he	makes	evident	via	many	examples,	it	was	only	through	the	creation	and	circulation	of	
scientifically	bred	potatoes,	pigs,	sheep,	wheat,	and	other	agricultural	organisms	that	the	
political	projects	of	fascist	regimes	could	be	materialized	on	the	ground.	The	creation	of	a	
well-fed	German	peasantry	rooted	to	the	soil	in	the	Nazi	state	demanded	disease-free	
potato	lines	and	hardy	pigs	that	could	be	fed	off	the	land.	Similarly,	there	could	be	no	
Portuguese	settlers	to	extend	the	Portuguese	nation	across	South	West	Angola,	without	
hardy	desert	sheep	whose	fur	could	be	sold	at	high	price	in	European	markets	for	those	
settlers	to	ranch.	And	so	on.	
	
Just	as	important	as	the	organisms	themselves	in	materializing	fascism	were	the	
institutions	created	to	foster	their	development,	mass	production,	and	dissemination	to	
farmers.	Consider	again	the	case	of	potatoes	in	Germany,	and	the	central	role	of	the	BRA	in	
standardizing	potato	production	along	the	lines	envisioned	by	the	Nazi	government.	A	
similar	story	may	be	repeated	for	the	role	of	the	Istituto	Nazionale	di	Genetica	per	la	
Cerealicoltura,	which	along	with	agricultural	commissions,	seed	associations,	and	
experiment	stations	were	central	to	Mussolini's	campaign	to	attain	self-sufficiency	in	wheat	
production,	the	so-called	Battle	of	the	Wheat.	In	the	case	of	a	comparable	wheat	campaign	
in	Portugal,	Saraiva	argues	that	new	varieties	and	the	institutions	created	to	amplify	and	
control	their	production	"contributed	to	the	first	institutional	forms	of	the	Portuguese	
fascist	corporatist	state"	(p.	48).		
	
Through	their	research,	agricultural	scientists	produced	standardized	and	
industrializable	organisms;	fascist	regimes	produced	institutional	forms	that	facilitated	the	
dissemination	and	utilization	of	those	"technoscientific	organisms";	technoscientific	
potatoes,	wheat,	and	pigs	in	turn	produced	the	material	form	of	the	fascist	state.	Lest	one	
take	from	this	summary	that	Saraiva	draws	a	line	between	scientists	and	politics,	let	me	be	
  
clear	that	Fascist	Pigs	presents	a	complex	enmeshing	in	which	scientists	both	serve	and	are	
served	by	the	aims	of	the	state.	This	is	not,	as	he	reminds	us,	a	story	of	the	"alternative	
science	that	fascism	produced"	but	of	"the	alternative	fascist	world	that	science	produced"	
(p.	6).		
	
	Saraiva's	emphasis	on	agricultural	experiment	stations	as	key	sites	for	the	
dissemination	of	new	varieties	and	breeds	as	well	as	the	modeling	of	idealized	agricultural	
settlement	and	production—which	rendered	them	central	to	the	realization	of	fascist	
ambitions	for	achieving	self-sufficiency	in	food	and	rooting	citizens	to	the	land—dovetails	
with	Schmalzer's	thorough-going	discussion	of	the	role	of	agricultural	extension	and	
demonstration	in	socialist	China.	And	in	the	case	of	Saraiva,	too,	the	analysis	diversifies	
considerably	our	understanding	of	what	agricultural	experiment	and	extensions	systems	
have	been	envisioned	to	do	and	have	done.		
	
Whereas	Schmalzer's	reconstruction	of	the	lived	experiences	of	those	who	
participated	in	the	mass	scientific	experiment	movement	in	China	serves	as	a	corrective	to	
accounts	of	science	in	the	years	of	the	Cultural	Revolution	that	emphasize	failure,	hardship,	
and	suffering,	Saraiva's	account	continually	calls	attention	to	the	overlooked	implication	of	
agricultural	research	in	the	tactics	of	oppression,	domination,	and	extermination	pursued	by	
fascist	regimes.	Agricultural	stations,	and	the	technoscientific	organisms	they	developed,	
were	key	components	of	the	systems	of	production	and	governance—violent,	authoritarian	
systems	of	production	and	governance—intended	to	root	German,	Italian,	and	Portuguese	
peasants	to	the	national	soil.12	They	also	played	a	prominent	role	in	colonial	contexts.	
Saraiva's	detailed	accounts	of	agricultural	stations	in	Italian	Ethiopia	and	Portuguese	
Mozambique	and	South	West	Africa,	as	well	as	research	projects	carried	out	at	Auschwitz,	
call	attention	above	all	to	"the	continuity	of	fascist	colonialism	with	other	European	post-
slavery	imperial	experiences"	(p.	144).	In	other	words,	he	emphasizes	that	commodity	
production	to	support	the	expansion	of	the	national	economy	was	not	only	enabled	by	
agricultural	research	but	also	dependent	on	the	brutal	subjugation	of	native	peoples	(and,	in	
the	case	of	Auschwitz,	death-camp	workers)	and	extraction	of	their	labor.	
	
Saraiva's	analysis	of	these	particular	stations—and	their	core	products	of	coffee,	
cotton,	and	rubber—converges	with	previous	accounts	of	imperial	agricultural	stations	as	
instruments	for	the	control	of	native	peoples	and	environments.	His	subsequent	
investigation	of	agricultural	stations	meant	to	support	settler	colonies	(rather	than	
commodities	markets)	comes	to	still	starker	conclusions.	As	he	explains,	fascist	ambitions	
for	empire	included	both	the	creation	of	self-sufficient	economies	independent	of	the	world	
market	as	well	as	the	physical	extension	of	German,	Italian,	and	Portuguese	peasant	
populations	into	Eastern	Europe	and	Africa.	And	in	the	latter	case,	experiment	stations	and	
technoscientific	organisms	served	less	as	instruments	for	the	control	of	native	peoples	and	
more	as	tools	for	enabling	the	obliteration	of	such	peoples.	Karakul	sheep,	a	breed	prized	
for	its	heartiness	in	poor	conditions	and	for	the	prices	garnered	for	its	wool,	attracted	
attention	from	scientists	and	politicians	of	all	three	regimes.	They	created	research	
programs	and	stations	to	support	its	further	development	as	an	agricultural	animal	and	its	
                                                
12	This,	too,	is	thematized	in	contributions	to	the	HSNS	issue	mentioned	in	fn.	11.	
  
dissemination	across	newly	acquired	lands—lands	that	had	just	been	or	would	soon	be	
cleared	of	local	peoples.	"Karakul,"	Saraiva	summarizes,	"is	a	good	point	of	entry	into	the	
larger	history	of	fascist	frontier	genocide"	(p.	233).	
	 	
If	reading	Green	Revolution,	Red	Revolution	productively	upends	one's	ideas	about	
the	nature	of	an	agricultural	experiment,	Fascist	Pigs	gives	a	new,	and	more	harrowing,	
perspective	on	the	work	of	agricultural	extension.	Here	extension	is	not	simply	the	
dissemination	of	best	practices	and	improved	agricultural	organisms,	though	it	certainly	
includes	that.	It	is	also	the	physical	extension	of	the	authoritarian	state,	into	the	everyday	
lives	of	German,	Italian,	and	Portuguese	citizens	in	the	mid-twentieth	century	and,	with	
particular	violence,	over	peoples	and	lands	encountered	through	imperial	domination.		
	
Taken	together,	these	provocative	books	should	encourage	historians	of	agricultural	
modernization	to	consider	whether	established	narratives	of	research	and	extension	could	
be	enriched.	Perhaps,	for	example,	the	easy	availability	of	institutional	and	scientific	records	
in	the	cases	of	German	or	American	agricultural	experiment	stations	(as	opposed	to	the	
challenges	faced	by	Schmalzer	in	her	research,	and	thus	her	need	to	reconstruct	from	the	
bottom-up)	has	resulted	in	our	overlooking	the	understanding	of	experiment	at	the	
grassroots	level.13	My	work	on	mid-century	American	gardeners	suggests	that	they	routinely	
characterized	themselves	as	"experimenters"	and	took	pride	in	contributing	knowledge	to	a	
community	of	like-minded	practitioners.14	Might	we	find	similar	perspectives	among	
farmers?	Perhaps	we	have	also	neglected	too	much	the	responses	of	professionals,	in	
practice,	to	the	evidence	produced	by	the	"experiments"	of	farmers;	historians	of	colonial	
agriculture	have	revealed	cases	where	the	ideas	of	European	scientists	about	best	practices	
were	transformed	by	their	observations	of	local	approaches.15	Undoubtedly	the	
understanding	of	what	constitutes	a	meaningful	experiment	has	never	been	as	clear	as	
Philip	Kuhn	imagined.		
	
There	is	also	the	challenge	advanced	by	Schmalzer,	similarly	made	by	Jonathan	
Harwood	in	his	work	on	Europe's	Green	Revolution,	that	in	considering	how	agricultural	
modernization	unfolded	in	different	social	and	political	contexts—for	example,	friendly	to	
peasants	in	some	places	but	decidedly	unfriendly	in	others—we	might	come	to	a	new	vision	
of	how	agricultural	research	and	production	can	and	ought	to	be	organized.16	We	know	well	
from	existing	studies	that	the	adoption	of	new	agricultural	technologies,	produced	within	
agricultural	research	institutions	and	introduced	with	good	intentions—can	entail	significant	
social	and	political	consequences	alongside	greater	production:	Hybrid	corn	empowered	
seed	sellers	over	farmers.	Mechanized	tomato	harvesters	privileged	large-scale	growers	and	
made	some	labor	redundant.	The	high-yielding	varieties	of	the	Green	Revolution	in	many	
cases	further	advantaged	better-off	farmers	while	leaving	poorer	agriculturalists	behind.	In	
short,	using	the	best	agricultural	science	and	latest	technology	to	enhance	productivity	has	
                                                
13	See	Henke	(2000)	for	an	analysis	of	the	role	of	place	in	the	interpretation	of	agricultural	
experiments.	
14	Curry	(2014).	
15	Bonneuil	(1999),	Tilley	(2011).	I	thank	Jonathan	Harwood	for	this	observation.	
16	Harwood	(2012).	
  
not	always	resulted	in	the	greater	security	of	farmers	or	in	increased	human	wellbeing.	
Schmalzer	suggests	that	in	confronting	the	history	of	agricultural	modernization	in	Maoist	
China,	with	its	particular	articulation	of	the	relationship	between	science	and	society	and	
between	agricultural	change	and	social	change,	"we	will	be	better	positioned	to	confront	
problems	of	hunger	and	sustainability	in	appropriately	social	and	political	ways,	and	avoid	
the	pitfalls	of	imagining	purely	technological	solutions	to	the	problems	we	face	together"	(p.	
26).	
	
Of	course,	giving	due	attention	to	political	and	social	arrangements	in	setting	goals	
for	agricultural	research	and	making	decisions	about	production	should	not	lead	us	to	see	
scientific	and	technological	tools	as	secondary	in	addressing	the	shortcomings	of	
contemporary	agricultural	systems	around	the	world.	As	Saraiva	makes	abundantly	clear,	
the	alternative	modernist	reality	imagined	in	fascism	was	only	made	possible	through	
scientific	research.	Though	this	may	make	us	wary	of	the	power	of	science	and	technology,	
it	should	also	alert	us	to	the	possibilities	of	establishing	a	research	infrastructure—and	a	
constellation	of	technoscientific	organisms—that	support	a	different,	more	equitable	and	
sustainable,	agricultural	modernity	than	the	one	we	now	inhabit.	
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